PURPOSE
The purpose of this report is to perform an availability analysis of the River Protection Project (Rep) Ventilation Stack Continuous Air Monitor (CAM) Interlock System to support development of responses to Contractor Surveillance Report Response Number: S99-TOD-TF-042-FOl (included in Appendix D) items 2 and 3.
Item 2: Perform an engineering evaluation to determine failure modes that affect the intended safety function of the CAMS with regard to the interlock TSR and make necessary recommendations to correct any deficiencies.
Item 3: Analyze surveillance frequency to determine adequacy.
The analysis computes CAM availability based on current RPP surveillance and maintenance practice, with a 30 minute alarm of all CAM failures, and assuming the TSR surveillance is the only CAM surveillance conducted.
1.2

CONCLUSION
Ventilation Stack Continuous Air Monitor Interlock System failure modes, failure frequencies and system availability have been evaluated for the RPP. The evaluation concludes that CAM availability is as high as assumed in the safety analysis and that the current routine system surveillance is adequate to maintain this availability. Further, requiring an alarm to actuate upon CAM failure is not necessary to maintain the availability credited in the safety analysis, nor is such an arrangement predicted to significantly improve system availability. However, if CAM failures were only detected by the 92-day functional tests required in the Authorization Basis (AB), CAM availability would be much less than that credited in the safety analysis. Therefore it is recommended that the current surveillance practice of daily simple system checks, 30-day source checks and 92-day functional tests be continued in order to maintain CAM availability.
2.0
BACKGROUND
The safety function of the CAM Interlock System is to shutdown active exhaust ventilation on a high radiation reading to limit the release of airborne radionuclides after HEPA filters are damaged by an in-tank spray leak or HEPA failure due to a high temperature accident. The "anticipated" (>lO-'/yr to < 10°/yr), while the frequency of the accident with failed controls (CAM Interlocks) is "unlikely" (>104/yr < IW'/yr). This is nomihally a factor of 100 reduction in the frequency, implying that the CAM Interlock system has a 99% probability of being available to mitigate this accident. The safety analysis assumption for CAM Interlock system availability is thus 0.99.
The question raised in Surveillance Number: S99-TOD-TF-042-FOl is, "can the CAM Interlock System meet its operability requirements if CAM Interlock System failures are not alarmed at a continuously manned (e.g., a control room manned 24 hours a day) location?" The CAM failure -modeevaluation and-surveillance frequency analysis question is clarified for this analysis to be, "Given the CAM Interlock System failure histoy, is it necessary to alarm CAM Interlock System failures at a continuously manned location in order to maintain the system availability credited in the safety analysis?" This question is addressed by evaluating CAM Interlock System failure modes and failure rates over the past two years w i t h system availability analysis and comparing the system availability to that credited in the safety analysis.
ANALYSIS
3.1
ANALYSIS APPROACH
The current RPP AB identifies the Continuous Air Monitor Interlock Systems as safety controls.
The assessment of the effectiveness of the CAMs was based on the qualitative estimate that the CAMs reduced the accident frequency by about two orders of magnitude. This implies that the CAMs have an availability of 0.99. Availability is the probability that a system is in an operable condition at any random point in time.
An analysis was done to determine how accurate the qualitative assessment was and to identify what surveillance is required to achieve a CAM availability of 0.99. The analysis was based on two years of experience at RPP and the application of standard computational methods currently in use in system reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM) analysis and for Probabilistic Risk Assessments (NURl5G/CR-2300).
Availability can be computed by the following equation, where failures are discovered as a result of a surveillance activity (NURl5G/CR-2300):
where:
A systedequipment availability h: systedequipment failure rate (failureshour) RPP-5453 REV0 t: surveillance interval (hours)
Alternatively,-if there is relatively instantaneous failure detection, availability can be represented by (NUREG/CR-2300):
,where:
MTBF: systedequipment mean time between failure (llh)
-.MTTR: systedequipment mean time to repair (repair time includes failure detection and correction times)
Based on current RPP practice, equation (1) and equation (2) were both used to assess the current availability of the CAMs, and to determine if availability is driven more by the surveillance frequency or by the time needed to repair the system. CAM failure history was used to derive CAM failure rates. Because the CAMs are currently subject to three different types of surveillance actions, the CAM system was addressed as consisting of three subsystems, each made up of those components whose failure could be detected by a particular surveillance activity. 1. Equipment whose failures are detectable by the 24-hour simple system check surveillance;
2. Additional equipment whose failures are detectable by the 30-day source check surveillance; and 3. The remaining equipment whose failures are detectable by the 3-month Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) finctional test surveillance.
Based on defining the CAM Interlock System as made up of three elements, the availability of the CAMs is computed as follows:
In practice, a number of different system checks are performed such as 6-hour operations checks, 24-hour Health Physics Technician checks, 15-day filter changes, etc. Some failures are alarmed. For the purposes of this availability analysis, alarmed failures and failures found during routine 6-hour operations checks are assumed to only be detected by the 24-hour (daily) simple system checks. Failures actually detected during 15-day filter changes are assumed to only be detected by the 30-day source checks.
Because the data available often does not include the exact time that the failure occurred, it has been assumed that failures occur, on average, in the middle of the surveillance interval.
Sensitivity studies were performed to examine the impact of various proposed surveillance alternatives on CAM availability based on current failure experience. The cases examined were 
AVAILABILITY ANALYSIS RESULTS
The availability analysis equations described above have been applied to the CAM operating data to study how system availability may be affected by changes in surveillance practices. The calculations for the specific cases analyzed are included in Appendix B, including inputs and outputs for each case. The results are summarized in Table 2 .
As shown in Table 2 , availability analysis predicts that the current practice of performing a daily simple system check, a 30-day source check, and a 92-day system fhnctional test results in an availability of 0.993. This compares well with the observed availability of 0.995 shown in 
Surveillance Results
Safety class system operability requirenents were not met for the ventilation stack continuous air monitor (CAM) interlock system (LCO 3.1.4).
* :
DOE Order'5480.22, "Technical Safety Requirements," .Attachment 1, Section 11,
Paragraphb.Z.P(h).and 2.5 are implemented through HNF-DS-WM-TSR-006, "Tank Waste Remediation System ,Technical Safety Requir4ments.'
UcWaud: Provided on page 2
Discussion and mplanation: -: specifies;that a'system'and all necessary attendant eqriipment shall be capable of pelforming '.the systems specified,function. specifies that the CRM must measure the sample flow stream and shutdown the.exhauster within 10 minutes of exceeding a preset radiation'level.
. .
The definition of operable-operability (HNF-SD-WM-TSR-006)
The functional requirement for the C M . 1°F-SD-WH-SEL-040)
. . . . : -continued -q u i r e m e n t ; the CAM is not capable of shutting down the exhauster within 10 minutes when d CAM equipment failure, e.g. vacuum pump.occurS. If an equiement failure occurred, .the CRH could operate for up to 6 hours in.an inoperable status because the CAM is not in:erlocked to shutdown the exhauster and,alanns are not monitored continuously; Therefore, the ventilatiowstack CAM 1nterlock.system does not meet operability requirements because the system 10 minute shutdown functional requirement cannot be met upon failure of a system safety.class component.
Continued
p:
CAM shall activate an interLock to shut dowwthe exhauster within 10 minutes of detecting a radiation.level'that exceeds the preset .level. On CAM faihre, the. monitors hust actuate an alarm and/or an interlock to shut.down the exhaust system." These two.sentences differentiate between C&Y activation due to detecting radiation levels and'C&Y failures. The interlock and 10 minute requirements are applicable to CAM activation. instrument buildings. This is considered acceptable because of the low probability Of an event occurring concurrent with a supporting System failure. HNF-SD.9t.l-SEL-040,. Section 6.1.1.3 states the "The
